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Abstract
For law enforcement purposes corruption and fraud are hard battles. Because
of the highly secretive and premeditated nature of these crimes, prime witnesses
are themselves often implicated in the fraudulent transaction. Promises of immu-
nity and whistle blowing rewards are often required to resolve these information
asymmetries. These insights have set a trend, both in scholarship and law en-
forcement practice, towards reward-based approaches (carrots), as an alternative
or complement to punishment based deterrence (sticks). Applying the U.S. False
Claims Act (FCA) as an analytical framework, we provide a critical review of the
efficiency limitations of whistle blowing. More specifically, the formal model de-
veloped in this contribution, reveals a gap between social and private incentives in
whistle blowing, both with regard to the decision to pursue litigation and the tim-
ing of whistle blowing. First, while an insider will blow the whistle whenever his
expected recovery exceeds the expected costs of litigation, enforcement agencies
seek to optimise enforcement in the long run. The autonomy of whistle blowers to
pursue claims without government involvement, weakens the government’s bar-
gaining position and obstructs the government’s ability to weigh in wider factors
of enforcement (the effect of an individual case on a multiple claim suit, etc.).
Second, whenever rewards are tied to recovery, bounty awards create a perverse
incentive whereby fraudulent practices are not terminated at a socially optimal
point in time. The potential race among whistle blowers cannot mitigate this ef-
fect fully because the stigma and loss of opportunities on the job market act as
internal constraints on whistle blowing.
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ABSTRACT 
For law enforcement purposes corruption and fraud are hard battles. Because of 
the highly secretive and premeditated nature of these crimes, prime witnesses are 
themselves often implicated in the fraudulent transaction. Promises of immunity 
and whistle blowing rewards are often required to resolve these information 
asymmetries. These insights have set a trend, both in scholarship and law 
enforcement practice, towards reward-based approaches (carrots), as an 
alternative or complement to punishment based deterrence (sticks).  
Applying the U.S. False Claims Act (FCA) as an analytical framework, we 
provide a critical review of the efficiency limitations of whistle blowing. More 
specifically, the formal model developed in this contribution, reveals a gap 
between social and private incentives in whistle blowing, both with regard to the 
decision to pursue litigation and the timing of whistle blowing. First, while an 
insider will blow the whistle whenever his expected recovery exceeds the expected 
costs of litigation, enforcement agencies seek to optimise enforcement in the long 
run. The autonomy of whistle blowers to pursue claims without government 
involvement, weakens the government’s bargaining position and obstructs the 
government’s ability to weigh in wider factors of enforcement (the effect of an 
individual case on a multiple claim suit, etc.). Second, whenever rewards are tied 
to recovery, bounty awards create a perverse incentive whereby fraudulent 
practices are not terminated at a socially optimal point in time. The potential race 
among whistle blowers cannot mitigate this effect fully because the stigma and 
loss of opportunities on the job market act as internal constraints on whistle 
blowing.  
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Under U.S. False Claims Act (FCA) individuals may litigate fraudulent claims on 
behalf of the government. On the basis of "qui tam"1 actions anyone who 
possesses evidence of fraud against federal or state programs can file a 
complaint.2 Recent revisions of the FCA have enhanced the financial incentives to 
file a lawsuit on behalf of the government. 
The enlistment of citizens in law enforcement is part of a larger trend to 
combat corruption and fraud through rewards instead of damages. As such, the 
remunerative approach of the FCA finds support in recent scholarship that 
suggests the use of financial incentives (carrots) as an alternative to the deterrence 
based punishment (sticks).3 
This Article provides an economic analysis of rewards as an alternative to 
punishment based deterrence. We find that bounty awards create a perverse 
incentive whereby fraudulent practices are not terminated at a socially optimal 
point in time. The potential race among whistle blowers cannot mitigate this effect 
fully because the stigma and loss of opportunities on the job market act as internal 
constraints on whistle-blowing. These constraints significantly reduce the 
preventive effect of qui tam litigation and reward-based approaches. 
Section II provides a concise overview of the Amended Federal Claims Act. 
Section IIII examines the incentives for whistle blowing under the False Claims 
Act. Sections IV analyses the strategic options of the government to intervene in 
whistle blowing litigation. Section V analyses the gap between private and public 
incentives to pursue fraud under the False Claims Act. Section VI examines the 
timing problem inherent in whistle blowing. Section VII concludes. 
 
                                                
 
1
 Qui tam is derived from the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso in 
hoc parte sequitur”, meaning “who as well for the king for himself sues in this matter.” WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 162 & n. 41 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1900). 
 
2
 On the historical antecedents of qui tam, see Note, The Qui Tam Doctrine, 7 TEX INTL 
LF 415, 418 (1972). See also WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 4 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 240 (Little, 
Brown, 2d ed 1938);  Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government: Interests: 
Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government Right to Veto Settlements of 
those Actions, 47 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1045 (1998); Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against 
Whistleblowers: Should Counterclaims Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims 
Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 726-35 (1993); James B. Helmer Jr., How Great is Thy 
Bounty: Relator’s Share Calculations Pursuant to the False Claim Act, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 737 
(2000). For an analysis of the English evolution of Qui Tam and its implications in the American 
context, see J. Randy Beck , The False Claims Act And The English Eradication Of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C.L. REV. 539 (2000). 
 
3
 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A 
Mechanism to Deter Bribes And Other Cooperative Crimes , THE BERKELEY LAW & ECONOMICS 
WORKING PAPERS, Vol. 2000: No. 2, Article 13. Available at 
<<http://www.bepress.com/blewp/default/vol2000/iss2/art13>> 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art13
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
II. ENFORCING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: INFORMATION 
FOR DOLLARS  
In the wake of expansions of government budgets in the eighties followed 
increases of fraudulent appropriations of government funds. The costs of inflated 
bills and false claims by government contractors, especially in defence spending4 
and health care,5 amount to billions of dollars each year. Fraud is estimated at $ 
50 billion or one tenth of the entire federal budget and, according to some reports, 
rises up to $ 100 billion annually.6 The recovery rates of white-collar crime are 
estimated at one-tenth of one percent of annual fraud.7 Government prosecutors 
and investigators face fraudulent practices8 by corporations that are able to spend 
resources that vastly outweigh the time and assets available to government 
officials.9 The complexity of financial accounts, organizational realities, and 
jurisdictional issues complicate the enforcement of corporate criminality. 
Evidence problems are considerable in this area of law enforcement.10 Chain 
arrangement and intermediary transactions conceal the nature of business 
transactions and render proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt an onerous 
burden.11 
Traditionally, the government relies on internal audits, civil investigative 
                                                
 
4
 In the 1980's the majority of defence contractors were suspected of large scale fraud and 
illicit procurements. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267. In a 
recent case  
 
5
 In recent years, several false claims cases have concentrated on health care claims. 
These suits include recoveries against Tenet Healthcare for inflated reimbursement claims ($4.3 
million); Northwestern University for inflated work sheets involved in research grants ($5.5. 
million); San Diego Hospital Association for misrepresented costs ($6.2 million); Mcleaod 
Regional Medical Center for false claims for services rendered ($15 million), etc. See Department 
of Justice, Official Press Announcements. Available at <<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/>. For an 
overview of the largest recent recoveries, see also Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims 
Legal Center, Statistics. Available at <<http://www.taf.org/statistics.html>>.   
 
6
 S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5268. 
 
7
 Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government: Interests: Qui Tam 
Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government Right to Veto Settlements of those 
Actions, 47 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1042 (1998). 
 
8
 See James B. Helmer Jr., How Great is Thy Bounty: Relator’s Share Calculations 
Pursuant to the False Claim Act, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 737, 743, notes 37-38  (2000) and sources 
cited therein.  
 
9
 S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5268. 
 
10
 As a civil fraud statue, the FCA operates under the lowered evidence standard of 
preponderance of evidence.  
 
11
 “...books of account are confusing because the white-collar criminal wants them that 
way”,  John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723,754 (1982).  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
5    Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the FCA 
 
 
-5- 
demands, and the Inspector General to obtain information on organizational crime 
and fraud.12 By rewarding whistle blowers the False Claim Act (FCA) enlists 
those individuals with the best knowledge of illicit procurements from the 
government.13 Employees of a company or organization usually have access to 
information on wrongdoings that is superior to even the “best conceived 
government inspection system.”14 Some degree of involvement is often necessary 
to obtain secretive information on a fraudulent transaction. Indeed, the prime 
witnesses of corporate fraud are themselves often implicated in the fraudulent act. 
Therefore, promises of immunity are needed to induce offenders to come forward 
and are best conceived as a “...price the government must pay to prosecute its 
prime target.”15 
To improve prosecution and recovery, the FCA invests private individuals with 
the ability to litigate fraudulent claims on behalf of the government against “any 
person who knowingly presents...to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment”.16  
                                                
 
12
 Todd B. Castleton, Comment: Compounding Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator 
Information Under the False Claim Act and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 328 (1996). 
 
13
 Increasing the probability and severity of punishment crucially depends on the 
expensive endeavour of gathering sufficient evidence. This supports the cost/benefit perspective of 
rewarding insiders for reporting wrongdoings.  
 
14
 Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counterclaims 
Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 718  
(1993) with reference to John L. Howard, Current Developments in Whistleblower Protection, 39 
LAB. L.J. 67 (1988) and Lewis D. Solomon & Terry D. Garcia, Protecting the Corporate Whistle 
Blower Under Federal Anti-Retaliation Statutes, 5 J. CORP. L. 275, 276 (1980). 
 
15
 This presents a paradox for law enforcement efforts: high expected punishments deter 
corruption but can only result when some offenders are promised low penalties. Susan Rose-
Ackerman, <insert full citation> (2003). For example, granting immunity to the blameworthy is 
strictly necessary to combat tax offences,. See John Braithwaite, Inegalitarian Consequences of 
Egalitarian Reforms to Control Corporate Crime, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1127 (1980) and Sutton & Wild, 
Corporate Crime and Social Structure, in Two Faces of Deviance: Crimes of the Powerless and the 
Powerful 101-22 (P. Wilson & J. Braithwaite eds. 1978). 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (1994). However, 
there are limits to the legislator’s desire to “use a rogue to catch a rogue”. Id. Relators that are 
criminally convicted for conduct arising from a violation of the False Claim Act are excluded from 
a reward. Likewise, when a person was clearly involved in the planning and initiation of the 
violation of Section 3729, the court can decide, when appropriate, to reduce the share of the 
proceeds. Also, the automatic discovery provision of Rule 26(a) of the Amendments to the Federal 
rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) requires that a defendant, without awaiting a discovery request, 
discloses all the names of persons “likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed 
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings.” See Todd B. Castleton, Comment: Compounding 
Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator Information Under the False Claim Act and the 1993 
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 343 (1996) (in 
combination with Rule 11, which enable costless withdrawal from the litigation by plaintiffs, the 
FCA will create an influx of parasitic cases). 
 
16
 31 U.S.C. 3729. Knowingly” is defined widely and includes submitting claims with 
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the information contained in those claims, including 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art13
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The 1986 amendment of the FCA increases both the percentage of the whistle 
blower’s reward and the total amount recoverable by the government. Prior to the 
1986 amendment, qui tam plaintiffs, also termed relators, might receive up to 10 
percent of the recovery if the government intervened in the litigation or as much 
as twenty-five percent if the relator conducted the suit individually.17 The 1986 
amendment increases the whistle blower’s share to twenty-five percent of a 
maximum of thirty percent for carrying the case without government 
intervention18 and between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the recovery when 
the government intervenes.19 The amended FCA also imposes a mandatory fine of 
$ 5000 - $ 10,000 for every false claim submitted.20 The FCA creates civil 
liability, enabling the government to collect treble damages and a mandatory fine 
of 5000 to 10,000 $ for each false claim submitted.21 The whistle blower must file 
the complaint under seal and serve it upon the government.22 Within a sixty day 
period from filing, the government must decide whether it will intervene and take 
primary responsibility for the case.23 If the government decides to take on the 
action, the whistle blower retains the right to remain a party to the action,24 
although the government is not bound by the actions of the whistle blower.25 If the 
government declines to intervene, the whistle blower retains the right to “conduct 
the action”26 but cannot dismiss the action without the consent of the court and the 
Attorney General.27  
 
 
                                                                                                                                
failure to supervise adequately employees that submit false claims to the government. 31 U.S.C. 
3729(b). See United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Fla. 1990). (bank held liable for false 
representation by officer acting on behalf of a Small Business Administration loan applicant). 
 
17
 Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 232 
(1976). 
 
18
 31 U.S.C. section 3730(d)(2) (1988)  
 
19
 31 U.S.C. section 3730(d)(1) (1988). The court determines the exact share of the qui 
tam plaintiff on the basis of the relator’s contribution to the prosecution of the FCA suit. The share 
of the plaintiff can drop to ten percent of the proceeds when the case has been tried on information 
other than that provided by the relator. Id. 
 
20
 31 U.S.C. section 3729(a) (1994). 
 
21
 31 U.S.C section 3729(a). 
 
22
 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(2)). 
 
23
 31 U.S.C. 3729(b) (2). 
 
24
 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(1) and 3730(b)(4a). 
 
25
 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A) (government can dismiss the action notwithstanding any 
objections of the relator); 3730(c)(2)(B) government has the right to settle the action over the 
objections of the relator on the condition that the courts determines that the settlement is fair; 
3730(c)(2)(C) government has the authority to limit the relator’s participation in the action. 
 
26
 31 U.S.C. 3730(c) (3). On the doctrinal foundation of qui tam standing, see Thomas R. 
Lee, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 543 
(1990). 
 
27
 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(1).  
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III. THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF THE FCA 
By increasing the percentage of the whistle blower, the 1986 FCA amendments 
alter both the incentive to initiate a qui tam suit and the government’s incentive to 
intervene in such litigation. These financial incentives induce whistle blowing by 
individuals who would otherwise not come forward.28  
The incentive effects of the 1986 amendments can be illustrated with a 
numerical example. Imagine an insider complaint alleging fraud on an inflated ($ 
20,000) government contract. Under the 1986 amendment treble provisions, 
recovery would amount to $ 60,000, while the pre-1986 maximum penalty would 
be $ 40,000. When the government intervenes and succeeds the qui tam plaintiff 
receives a recovery between fifteen and twenty five percent, amounting to an 
average personal recovery of $ 12,000 Under the pre-1986 regulation there is a 10 
percent share without guarantee, amounting to $ 4000.29 Where the costs to an 
employee or former employee of reporting organizational fraudulent misconduct 
are situated between $ 4,000 and $ 11,999, a rational maximizing insider will not 
file a qui tam suit under the old FCA but will do so under the amended FCA.  
When the government declines to intervene, the burden of litigation rests with 
the whistle blower. If the quit tam plaintiff goes it alone, he or she will bear the 
entire cost of litigation if the suit is unsuccessful. Imagine that the expected costs 
of litigation amounts to $ 10,000 and that the success rate is 50 percent.30 When 
the government does not intervene the whistle blower obtains $ 16,500 in a 
successful suit with a hundred percent success rate.31 At a 50 percent success rate 
the whistle blower’s expected benefit from litigation is $ 3250.32 Prior to the 
Amendment the share recoverable was 25 percent. With the lower damage bonus 
the expected value of continuing litigation drops to zero.33 Because some 
government officials could usually be found who had some knowledge of the 
fraudulent activity,34 the additional restriction of the pre-1986 FCA that the suit 
                                                
 
28
  Todd B. Castleton, Comment: Compounding Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator 
Information Under the False Claim Act and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 343 (1996), with reference to Elletta S. Callahan & Terry 
M. Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False 
Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 285 (1992). 
 
29
 Compare 20% of treble $ 60,000 = 12,000 (post-1986 FCA) to 10 % of double $ 
20,000 = 2,000 (pre-1986 FCA). If we assume uncertainty in receiving the bounty, as was the case 
prior to the amendment, the expected benefit from filing could as low as $ 2,000 if we assume a 
fifty percent uncertainty as to the reward policy of the government. 
 
30
 As we see below, large and highly successful qui tam claims are subject to government 
intervention. See Infra Section IV. 
 
31
 27,5% of 100% . 60,000  
 
32
 50 % 16,500 + 50% -10,000=8250-5000. 
 
33
 50% (10000) + 50% -10000 x 50% x 50 
 
34
 Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counterclaims 
Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 731 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art13
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should not be based on information already available to the government, creates a 
severe discount on the whistle blower’s expected reward. These hypothetical 
figures suggest why the qui tam provisions of the FCA remained largely dormant 
prior to the 1986 Amendment.  
Since the 1986 Amendment, the volume of qui tam litigation has increased 
dramatically. Between 1986 and 1992 over 400 suits were filed.35 By 1999 more 
than 2000 qui tam suits have been filed.36 The recovery of misappropriated funds 
increased from $ 2 million in 198637 to $ 243 million in the fiscal year 1995.38 
The continued increase of recoveries, over $1 billion annually in each of the past 
three years,39 is indicative of the effectiveness of whistle blowing under the FCA. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
(1993). 
 
35
 False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Law and 
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990) 
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice), cited in Todd B. Castleton, Comment: Compounding Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring 
Relator Information Under the False Claim Act and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 344 (1996) at footnote 124. 
 
36
 James B. Helmer Jr., How Great is Thy Bounty: Relator’s Share Calculations Pursuant 
to the False Claim Act, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 737, 744 (2000). 
 
37
 This figure is calculated on the basis of total amount of $ 50 billion in fraud committed 
against the government each year. S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), at 10-12, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-67; False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990) (statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice), cited in Todd B. Castleton, Comment: Compounding 
Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator Information Under the False Claim Act and the 1993 
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 344 (1996) at 
footnote 124. 
 
38
 Justice Department Recovers Over $1 Billion in Qui Tam Awards and Settlements, 
DOJ 95542, Oct. 18, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 614572. 
 
39
 In 2000 the FCA rewards has totalled 3 billion since the inception of the 1986 
Amandement. See announcement by the Justice Department, February 24, 2000, available at 
<<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/February/079civ.htm>>. The most recent figures report 
annual recoveries of qui tam cases pursued by the government of over $ 1 billion: $ 1.2. (2000), $ 
1.2 (2001), $ 1.04 (2002). See Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims Legal Center, Statistics. 
Available at <<http://www.taf.org/statistics.html>>. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
9
    
Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the FCA
 
 
-9- 
qui tam filings
DOJ intervention
cases individually pursued
by the whistle blower
 
 
Figure 1: Number of suits, interventions and whistle blower-conducted cases 
 
Recoveries result from litigation by either the DOJ or the qui tam plaintiff 
personally, depending on the government’s decision to intervene on the basis of 
whistle blower’s FCA claim. The DOJ intervenes in approximately twenty percent 
of the qui tam cases.40 Thirty-eight percent of the cases in which the government 
did not intervene, were subsequently abandoned by the whistle blower or 
dismissed in court. The termination of eighty percent of original claims may be 
indicative of a number of parasitic suits, where the qui tam action is based on 
information contained in the original criminal indictment, newspaper accounts of 
prosecutions by the government.41 But it also indicates a decisional divergence 
between the government and the private attorney general. This can be viewed 
from several perspectives: the government’s incentive to intervene, the gap 
between social and private incentives to take action against the fraud and the 
timing of filing. This Article addresses these issues respectively in sections V and 
VI and VII. First, we explore the dynamics of litigation between the whistle 
blower and the DOJ. 
 
                                                
 
40
 Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice 
Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claim Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 
409, 438 (1993), n. 139. Between the 1986 Amendments and 1993 more than 400 qui tam cases 
has been filed.  False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearings on H.R. 4563 before 
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992), at 25 (Statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice). The DOJ recovered $ 492 million in the qui tam cases in 
which it has intervened, averaging $ 4 million per case, compared to about 39,000 per case 
litigated by the relators alone. Id. 
 
41
  The 1943 Amendments to the False Claims Act eliminated these suits by prohibiting 
suits based on information that is already in possession of the government when the suit is filed. 
Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976). On the 
remaining problem of parasitic suits, see Todd B. Castleton, Comment: Compounding Fraud: The 
Costs of Acquiring Relator Information Under the False Claim Act and the 1993 Amendments to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 327, 343 (1996). 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art13
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IV. THE INCENTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO 
INTERVENE 
This Section explores the FCA’s interesting litigation dynamic between the 
relator, acting as “private attorney general”, and the Department of Justice (DOJ). 
 
A. Intervention by the DOJ 
 
When a whistle blower submits a claim, the government has 60 days to intervene 
and assume the leadership of the case.42 When the government intervenes, the 
relator remains a party to the action but takes a step back and can not object to 
dismissals or settlements made by the government. The DOJ may dismiss the 
action irrespective of the relator’s objections, provided the court conducts a 
hearing.43 Notwithstanding possible objections of the relator, the government may 
settle a suit if the court, upon a hearing, finds that the settlement is fair and 
reasonable.44 The government must inform the relator of the Government’s efforts 
and protect his or her financial stake, for instance, by calling and cross-examining 
witnesses.45 
On the other hand, when the government does not intervene, the relator must 
either initiate litigation at own expense or abandon the claim.46 The FCA 
Amendment reimburses litigation costs only to successful plaintiffs.47  
 
B.  The Balance of Power Between the DOJ and the Whistle Blower 
 
If the whistle blower pursues the claim he or she can either litigate to a court 
verdict or settle the case. In the latter scenario, the government and the court must 
                                                
 
42
 31 U.S.C. Section 3730(b)(2). 
 
43
 31 U.S.C. Section 3730(c)(2)(B). 
 
44
 31 U.S.C. Section 3730(d)(2). 
 
45
 S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 25-26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290-91. 
 
46
 See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 
232 (1976). For an overview, see Gretchen L. Forney , Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and 
Roles of the Government and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357 
(1998). 
 
47
 The FCA allows the government and relators to recover litigation costs.  See 31 U.S.C. 
Sections 3729(a), 3730(d) (1) : “Any such person shall also receive an amount for reasonable 
expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.”  Yet, 
litigation entails certain costs that are not recoverable. Satellite litigation, for instance, cuts into the 
relator’s share. See United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co. 41 F. 3d 
1032, 1045-47 (6th Cir. 1994); Federal Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F. 3d 447, 450 
(5th Cir. 1995). 
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consent to the dismissal of the suit.48 Currently there exists legal uncertainty 
whether the government has an absolute right to block the proposed settlement 
between the qui tam plaintiff and the defendant. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits are 
split over the exact role of the government in settling FCA qui tam claims when it 
has chosen not to intervene in the lawsuit.49 According to Section 3730(b)(1) of 
the FCA an action may be dismissed only “if the court and the Attorney General 
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting”.50 In 
Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp.51 the Ninth Circuit52 dismissed the government’s 
refusal to consent to the settlement between the relator and Northrop, on the 
allegation that it diverted money from the False Claims Act to the plaintiff’s 
personal claim.53 By contrast, in Searcy v. Philips Electronics North America 
Corp.,54 the Fifth Circuit upheld the governmental power to block settlements in 
straightforward manner.55   
There is the risk that a settlement will reflect an opportunistic diversion from 
the recovery amount, shared between the government and the relator, to a personal 
damage claim, such as a wrongful dismissal reward, which is obtained in total by 
the relator. Whistle blowers can structure a settlement with a defendant so that it 
and is heavy on attorney fees and wrongful dismissal charges while lowering the 
actual damages claim. As a result the relator then obtains a larger share at the 
                                                
 
48
  31 U.S.C. Section 3730(b)(1).   
 
49
 This issue is treated extensively in Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the 
Government: Interests: Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government Right to 
Veto Settlements of those Actions, 47 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1056 (1998) (finding legislative history 
and the text of the FCA in favor of a right of the government to block settlements beyond the 
initial sixty day period).    
 
50A literal reading of 3730(b)(1) leads to a veto power on behalf of the government 
because a suit must first be dismissed before it can be settled. 
 
51In Killingworth a former employee of Northrop alleged that the company had inflated 
cost estimates related to MX missile contract proposals. See United States ex re. Killingworth v. 
Northrop Corp., 25 F. 3d at 718 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
52
 In the Court’s interpretation 3730(b)(1) restricts the requirement of consent to dismissal 
or settlement to the initial sixty days of the suit during which 3730(b)(2) allows the government to 
intervene.  See Id. at 7222. 
 
53
 The Government contended that it concerned a “sweetheart settlement” between both 
parties, pointing to Northrop’s failure to pursue the statute of limitation defence which would have 
barred the wrongful termination claim. See Killingworth, 25 F. 3d at 718. 
 
54
 Searcy v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1997). Searcy concerns a 
qui tam action by Lyold T. Bortner and a private suit by five former Philips dealers which alleges 
that Philips fraudulently concealed its executive decision to abandon the United States electronics 
market while the government had purchased and leased large amounts of automation equipment 
relying on Philips’s ongoing participation in the U.S. market.   
 
55
 The parties agreed to a settlement of $1 million in exchange for release from “all 
claims and counterclaims asserted in any pleadings or other filing in action, or which could have 
been asserted by the parties in action, arising out of the transactions or occurrences that [were] the 
subject matter of [the] action.”  117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1997) at 155. 
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expense of the government. Such a tactic leaves both the relator and the defendant 
better off. It provides the whistle blower with a larger share of the recovery than 
he or she would be entitled to under the FCA, and enables the company to settle at 
a lower amount. The possibility of collusion between the relator and the 
fraudulent entity justifies some monitoring by the DOJ. In this light the Fifth 
Circuit in Searcy concluded that it is in the public interest to allow the government 
to maintain control over qui tam actions, even if it decided not to intervene.56 
However, because an unsuccessful relator bears his or her attorney fees and 
other expenses involved in litigating the qui tam suit, relators object that once they 
have taken the risk and incurred the expenses to litigate an action on an individual 
basis, the government should not be allowed to step forward at a later point and 
veto the resolution of this process. In other words, investing an absolute veto right 
in the government increases the risk of whistle blowing. Without reasonable limits 
prospective whistle blowers might be deterred57 by the prospect of hold-out 
behaviour by the government.58  
In the remainder of this Section we take a formalized approach to the dynamics 
the government and the whistleblower, and more particularly, we identify the 
conditions where the government is most likely to intervene.  
 
 
C.  A Game Theoretical Representation of Whistle Blowing Litigation  
 
Take the example of an employee who obtains insider information on 
fraudulent conduct by his or her employer/organization. The employee has three 
options: 
 
1. Resort to internal whistle blowing. The agent alerts higher 
management or a supervising authority within the organization. The 
potential whistle blower’s payoff (X) can be positive (for instance, 
promotion) or negative (e.g. ostracization by fellow workers, etc.).59 The 
                                                
 
56
 Id. 
 
57
 Gretchen L. Forney , Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of the Government 
and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357 (1998). 
 
58
 On the economics of hold outs, see Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 236, Newman, ed. (1998). 
59
 See, Cora Daniels, It's a Living Hell, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, April 2002: “At first the 
harassment was subtle. He says he was routinely denied days off and asked to cover for employees 
who were out. Co-workers kept their distance, and supervisors began criticizing his work. Three 
months later Robarge was out of a job.” 
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payoff of the government is 0.60  Social welfare is increased when internal 
whistle blowing prevents the fraud. 
 
2. Silence. Depending on the circumstances the payoff of the mute 
insider is Y which can be positive (e.g. promotion) or negative (e.g. 
dismissal if a superior discovers the fraud and faults the employee for not 
detecting or alerting). The payoff of the government is 0 or negative if the 
fraudulent act is followed through.  
 
3. Whistle blowing. The insider might submit a qui tam claim to the 
government. This leaves the government with the following options: 
 
a. Intervene. The government can: 
 
i. Dismiss the case: the payoff of the relator is –Z 
(with Z>0 due to retaliation whenever the filing of the qui 
tam claim becomes public) and the payoff of the 
government is 0 (we assume that the costs of investigating 
the case are zero)     
  
ii. Litigate: the expected payoff of the relator is 
dependent on the probability that the government will win 
the case (p1) multiplied with the relator’s share (1A) minus 
the relator’s expected costs of whistle blowing (-Z). The 
payoff of the government equals the probability that it will 
win the case (p1) multiplied with its share ((1- 1)A) and 
minus the probability that it will lose the case (1-p1) 
multiplied with its litigation costs (CG).61 
 
iii. Settle:  the government needs to obtain at least the 
expected payoff litigation.62 Thus, the minimum settlement 
demand equals the government’s expected payoff from 
litigation divided by (1- 1).63  The maximum settlement 
offer equals the expected litigation losses of the firm 
                                                
60
 Note that we do not integrate increases of social welfare into the government’s utility 
function. 
61
 See, supra, footnote 51. 
62
 We assume that cases litigate on at rates that emulate the expected payoffs of litigating the 
case while discounting litigation costs. See, the literature on bargaining in the shadow of the law. 
E.g. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).   
63
 The exact amount will of course depend on the relative bargaining strength of each party. 
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(p1A+CF). The relator will receive a share of 1 and the 
government retains the (1-1) share. The relator also faces 
the cost of starting a qui tam case (-Z). 
 
 
b. Decline. This leaves the whistle blower with the following 
options: 
 
i. Dismiss the case: the payoff of the relator is –Z and 
the payoff of the government is 0. 
 
ii. Litigate:  the expected payoff of the relator is the 
probability that he will win the case (p2) multiplied with his 
share (2A), minus the probability that he will lose the case 
(1-p2) multiplied with his litigation costs (CR) minus the 
relator’s cost of starting a qui tam case (Z). The expected 
payoff of the government equals the probability that the 
relator will win the case (p2) multiplied with the 
government’s share ((1- 2)A). 
 
iii. Settle: the relator will demand at least the expected 
payoff from litigating the case. Thus, the minimum 
settlement demand equals the relator’s expected payoff 
from litigation divided by 2.64 The government receives its 
share of (1-2). The maximum settlement offer equals the 
expected litigation losses of the firm (p2A+CF). The relator 
will receive his share of 2 and the government its share of 
1-2. The relator also faces the cost of starting a qui tam 
case (-Z). 
 
The following pay-off tree inputs the various possibilities:   
 
 
 
                                                
64
 Note that Z is not included in this amount because it represents sunk costs. 
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Figure 1. 
 
The following notations apply: 
X represents the potential relator’s expected payoff of internal whistle blowing  
Y represents the potential relator’s expected payoff of remaining silent  
Z are the relator’s expected costs of whistle blowing  
Cg represents the litigation costs of government  
Cr denotes the litigation costs of relator 
Cf  is the litigation costs of the accused firm 
p denotes the probability of winning the qui tam case where: 
p1  is the probability that the government will win the case;  
p2  is the probability that the whistle blower will win the case without 
government support 
A denotes the penalty or recovery resulting from the qui tam case 
1 is the percentage of the recovery going to relator when government intervenes 
and leads the case  
2 is the percentage of recovery going to relator when the government declines 
and relator leads the case;  
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D.  The Decision to Intervene 
 
Now we are ready to analyze the circumstances where the government will most 
likely take on a qui tam case and when it will decline to intervene. For the sake of 
simplicity, we examine the situation in which the government expects that the 
case will be litigated (by itself or by the relator).65 The government will intervene 
and litigate if: 
 
 
p1(1-1)A – (1-p1)CG  >  p2(1-2)A,   or if 
 
CG <  [(p1(1-1) - p2(1-2))/(1-p1)]A               (1) 
 
 
Clearly, the following properties hold: 
 
1. if A increases, the probability that the government will intervene 
and litigate increases; 
2. as p1 diverges further from p2 (with p1 > p2 ), the probability that the 
government will intervene and litigate increases;  
3. as 1 diverges further from 2  (with 1 < 2), the probability that the 
government will intervene and litigate increases; 
4. if p1 increases and p1-p2 remains constant, the probability that the 
government will intervene and litigate increases.66 
 
The underlying intuition is straightforward. Despite the positive expected value 
of litigating the case, in some cases the government will decline to intervene, 
since it can free ride and avoid litigation expenses by leaving litigation to the 
relator.67 But free riding entails certain opportunity costs. When the relator 
litigates instead of the government, the expected award and the government’s 
share is reduced (p1 > p2  and 1 < 2). The costs of free riding may increase along 
the following three dimensions: when A increases, when p1 increases relative to p2 
or when 2 increases relative to 2.  
                                                
65
 The general results are not changed if we introduce probabilities T1 and T2, reflecting the 
chance event that the case will be settled, and some parameters W1 and W2, that represent the 
bargaining strengths of the government and the relator respectively. 
66
 More generally, the condition requires that p2 does not increase too much with increases of 
p1. 
67
  Other reasons for not intervening outside of this model are of course possible, e.g. 
leniency towards a cooperating firm etc.  
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It can also be demonstrated that the government’s incentive to take on a case 
increases with an increasing p1, even if the difference between p1 and p2 remains 
constant (p1  -  p2  = C). The RHS of eq. (1) becomes: [p1(2- 1 ) + C.(1- 2)/(1- 
p1)]A. More generally, the incentive of the government to take on a case increases 
with increases p1, when this is not accompanied by large increases of p2. The 
partial derivative of the RHS of eq(1) is positive if:    
 
      
A [(1-1) – p'2(1-2)] | (1-p1) + A [(p1(1-1) – (p2)(1-2)] (1-p1)-2 > 0 
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From the above follows that the government will take on strong cases (high A and 
high p1) and leave the initiative to the relator for weaker cases. However, the 
model also predicts that the government will intervene in some of the weakest 
cases. The intuitive explanation is that some cases are not worthwhile for the 
relator but will still be profitable to the government which has a higher probability 
of winning and receives a larger share of the recovery. In these cases the 
government will not recover anything if it decides to decline and leave the risk of 
litigation to the relator. The government will intervene not only when condition 
(1) is fulfilled, but also when: 
 
 
     p1(1-1)A – (1-p1)CG > 0                            
     p22A – (1-p2)CR < 0                               
 
 
When rearranging the terms we obtain : 
 
 
   CG  <   [p1/(1-p1)](1-1)A    
   CR  >   [p2/(1-p2)] 2A      
 
 
From this we derive the following results and predictions: 
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1) The government will intervene in cases in the high-range recovery 
range where: 
 
             CG <  [(p1(1-1) - p2(1-2))/(1-p1)]A 
 
2) the government will decline and the relator will intervene in cases 
in the mid-level recovery range where: 
 
            CG  >  [(p1(1-1) - p2(1-2))/(1-p1)]A 
            CR  <   [p2/(1-p2)] 2A     
 
3) the government will intervene in low recovery cases in which the 
relator would dismiss: 
 
                CG  <   [p1/(1-p1)](1-1)A    
                CR  >   [p2/(1-p2)] 2A      
 
 
  
 
VI. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE INCENTIVES OF WHISTLE 
BLOWING LITIGATION 
 
An important difference between the positions of the government and a whistle 
blower relates to incentives and objectives in enforcement. 68 The DOJ optimises 
enforcement in the long run. In deciding whether to pursue a fraudulent claim, the 
DOJ takes into account many factors, including the allocation of time and 
resources relative to other cases, 69 the effect of a case on an ongoing criminal 
investigation, the progress in uncovering a larger fraudulent network, etc. A 
potential whistle blower faces different incentives altogether: whenever expected 
recovery exceeds the expected costs of litigation, the relator will pursue the case. 
When the government decides not to intervene, the relator has the right to go it 
alone and conduct the trail at own expense and risk. 
There are several instances where social and private interests might diverge on 
                                                
 
68
 See generally, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of 
Law, 4 J. OF LEG. STUD.1 (1975). 
 
69
 Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice 
Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claim Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 
409, 438 (1993) (qui tam plaintiff autonomy disrupts optimal enforcement by the DOJ by forcing 
its private agenda upon the government). 
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the decision to litigate under the FCA. Sometimes the public interest is better 
served by leaving misconduct unprosecuted. The DOJ has an interest not simply 
in prosecution and punishment but also in generating goodwill to persuade 
companies to improve monitoring procedures. In some cases, leniency by the 
government will promote goodwill and better future behaviour, especially where 
there is an educational component.70 Indiscriminate prosecution of all offences 
might foster resentment and reduce motivation for future cooperation. It might be 
good inspectorial practice not to recommend a prosecution when the company 
comes forward and admits the fraudulent violation.71 In this regard the public 
knowledge provisions of the FCA act as a possible safeguard.72 Confessions will 
be enhanced when a company can prevent the wilful decision of private attorney 
generals to prosecute if the novelty aspect of the information is pre-empted by the 
company itself. This provision was introduced into the FCA with the 1943 
amendment which excludes the use of information that is already in the 
government’s possession.73 The most obvious reason why a prosecution might not 
be socially desirable relates to the costs of litigation. For certain offences, the 
social costs of litigation might not outweigh the benefits from recovery. Non-
litigious methods of achieving restitution, deterrence and incapacitation are often 
necessary because the costs of litigating complex white collar fraud is often 
daunting. Therefore, the prosecution of offenders is often based on the relative 
costs of a case, or because cooperation is not required to retrieve information.74 
The autonomy of the relator to pursue a claim individually, reduces the ability 
of the government to negotiate favourable settlements and to weigh in other 
factors, such as the effect of an individual case on a multiple claim suit. Despite 
the DOJ’s commitment not to prosecute, companies always face the possibility of 
litigation by an independent relator. Because the government cannot deliver a 
credible claim of immunity or non-prosecution, it is left with a weaker bargaining 
position. For example, in General Electric75 the relator successfully blocked a 
settlement between the DOJ and General Electric, leading the company to offer a 
                                                
 
70John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 752 (1982). 
 
71
 See Id. (suggesting that inconsistent enforcement is beneficial when the educative role 
of safety inspectors outweighs the enforcement role). 
 
72
 See 31 U.S.C. 3730 (e)(4)(A): “No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under 
this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the 
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.”  
 
73
 S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), at 10-12, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. At 5721-78. 
 
74
 John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723,754 (1982).  
 
75
 United States v. General Elec., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1992); United States ex. 
Rel. Pedicone v. Mazak Corp. , 807 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
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settlement amount fifteen times over the original agreed settlement with the 
DOJ.76 Although this type of uncertainty undercuts certain rule of law 
principles,77 the autonomy of private individuals can be a safeguard against 
corruption and collusion between the government and a private contractor.78 For 
instance, in General Electric the qui tam plaintiff accused the government of 
constructing a “sweetheart” deal and objected to the $ 234,000 agreement between 
the DOJ and General Electric. On the day of trail General Electric upped the 
settlement to $ 3.5 million.79 
To some extent the FCA creates a regime whereby the agreement of both the 
DOJ and the relator are strictly necessary to obtain a settlement. Economic theory 
predicts that the competitive allocation of complementary parts increases overall 
prices.80 Since both relator and the DOJ need to approve a settlement they are 
complimentary monopolists in the production oft he final product, the settlement. 
Uncoordinated decision-making by relator and DOJ will drive up settlement 
prices under the amended FCA. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
76
 See Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud, 76 A.B.A. J. 46 (Mar. 1990). 
See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert C. Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions 
of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments of the False Claims Act, and their Application to 
the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35 
(1991). 
 
77
 John T. Boese, Why Thompson is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce 
the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). 
 
78
 Because officials must have discretion to promise leniency in the context of the 
remunerative model of enforcement, there is an endogenous element of corruption to the relation 
between the public official and the corporate entity.  
 
79
 See, supra, note 73. 
 
80
 See, e.g. James Buchanan & Yoon J Yong, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and 
Anticommons Property, 43 J. L. & AND ECON. 1-13 (2000); Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, 
Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 (4) INT. REV. OF L. & ECON 
453-473 (2002). In the presence of concurrent controls on entry exercised by individual co-owners 
acting under conditions of individualistic competition, exclusion rights will be exercised even 
when the use of the common resource by one party could yield net social benefits. This is because 
the multiple holders of exclusion rights do not fully internalize the cost created by the enforcement 
of their right to exclude others. Norbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi and Ben Depoorter, 
Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model, 159 J. OF INST. & THEOR. ECON. 594-613. 
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VII. THE TIMING OF WHISTLE BLOWING 
A.  Introduction 
The FCA rewards whistle blowers a fixed proportion of the recovery from a 
successful lawsuit. Because the whistle blower’s reward is related to the recovery 
from the law suit, potential whistle blowers have an incentive to allow corruption 
to develop beyond the socially optimal point in time. The model below explores 
this adverse effect in more detail. 
  
 
B.  Quit Tam Private Incentives and Social Optimum 
 
Without “qui tam” whistle-blowing legislation the government will base 
expenditures on the rate of punishment and the severity of sanctions in order to 
minimize the social costs of combating fraud and corruption.81  One component of 
the rate of punishment is the probability of detection. For any level of investment 
in detection, there is a probability distribution that the government will detect the 
fraud at or before time t. However, despite high expenditures on detection, there 
remains a low probability that the government will discover the fraud even after a 
considerable period of time. The question before us is to what extent the average 
detection time will decrease when taking into account the effect of “qui tam” 
whistle blowing legislation. It is straightforward that, when we assume that the 
amount of fraud within the firm increases over time, whistle blowers generally do 
not have an incentive to come forward at the moment of detection. 
 
We use the following notations : 
 
x: the government expenditure on detection  
px(t): the probability that the government will detect the fraud independently of 
the relator at or before time t1 with a level of expenditure x on detection; dpx/dt > 
0 
H(t): the expected amount of fraud at time t  
B(t) : the expected award of the relator, with B(t) =  H(t) 
 
For a given government expenditure on detection x, the relator will choose the 
optimal point in time t* to come forward and maximize his expected payoffs, as 
represented by the following function: 
 
R(t) = px(t).0 + (1-pX(t)).B(t) , or  
                                                
81
  Modeling the social cost function is beyond the scope of this article. 
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R(t) = (1-px(t)). H(t) 
                                    
 
Independent discovery by the government, prior to the whistle blowing, 
preempts a qui tam action and prevents a potential whistle blower from 
capitalizing on his insider information.82 For the sake of simplicity, we make two 
additional assumptions. First, unless the government has started an official 
procedure, the relator is not aware of possible knowledge of the fraud by the 
government. In other words, the whistle blower cannot update his decision.83 
Second, the relator values future values equally to present values.84 
The model illustrates the lack of urgency on behalf of the whistleblower upon 
discovering fraud. On the one hand, waiting increases the likelihood that the 
government will detect the fraud prior to whistle blowing and, consequently, the 
probability that the prospective whistle blower will end up empty handed. On the 
other hand, by waiting the total amount of fraud increases and so does the 
relator’s proportional share of the penalty. By balancing both factors the relator 
determines the (privately) optimal time to come forward. The private incentives of 
the whistle blower thus stand in opposition to the social welfare optimum. From a 
social welfare maximizing viewpoint fraud is halted at the earliest stage of 
possible detection,85 when the damage is minimal and still reversible. In response 
to this effect, the government could adjust enforcement levels and reward shares 
to align private and social incentives. By taking into account the perverse 
incentives of the qui tam plaintiff, the FCA could be improved through 
mechanisms that punish delays in reporting or tie the reward to prevented 
damages. 
 
C.  The Limits of Whistle Blowing Competition 
Recent literature advocates the use of bounties and immunity in law enforcement. 
When offered bounties and immunity, criminals would not be able to trust each 
other. Because each partner is a potential whistle blower, corruption might 
                                                
82
  For modeling purposes, this assumption could be relaxed by introducing probability  
(0<<1) that the relator will still receive an (perhaps smaller) award if the government already 
detected the fraud.  
83
  If assumption two does not hold and the relator knows at every point in time whether the 
government has found out about the fraud or not, the relator will update his decision at every point 
in time the government did not find out about the fraud yet. This will shift the time that the relator 
will communicate the fraud to a later point. This assumption does not affect the point made here. 
84
 In other words, the discount factor = 1, and the discount rate = 0. This assumption can be 
relaxed by introducing a discount factor , with 0<<1. 
85
 Put differently, the social optimal amount of delay is zero. 
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unravel because the necessary cooperation and trust is dissipated.86 The “first in 
time” and the “public disclosure” provisions of the amended FCA accommodate 
these proposals.87 Once a relator has filed suit, other insiders may not bring action 
on the same set of facts.88 Likewise, cases cannot be tried on the basis of 
information that is already disclosed in a public forum, unless the whistle blower 
proves that he or she is the original source of the information.89 Insiders will 
engage in a race to be the first to disclose, fearing that others will bring forward 
the essential information and reap the award and accompanying immunity.90 
As the model in IV illustrates, there are a number of limitations to the bounty 
enforcement model. Due to the secrecy involved with fraud and corruption, there 
are not always multiple insiders that posses duplicate information. Also, the 
private expected benefits of whistle-blowing must outweigh the costs of the 
insider. Despite the protection under the FCA91 and other federal protective 
measures,92 a whistle blower faces substantial financial and other risks. Evidence 
thresholds93 and imperfect enforcement leave the whistle blower vulnerable to 
                                                
 
86
 Robert D. Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to 
Deter Bribes And Other Cooperative Crimes , THE BERKELEY LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING 
PAPERS, Vol. 2000: No. 2, Article 13. Available at 
<<http://www.bepress.com/blewp/default/vol2000/iss2/art13>>. 
 
87
 Respectively, 31 U.S.C. 3730 (e)(2)(A): “No court shall have jurisdiction over an 
action brought under subsection (b) against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a 
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brought.”  
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retaliation (e.g. harassment, threats of termination, suspension, non-promotion, 
reassignment, transfer, denial of training, withholding wages or other benefits, 
closer supervision and scrutiny, or pestering).94 Former employees are stigmatized 
and black listed on the job market as whistle blowers.95 The private costs of the 
whistle blower may thus prevent disclosure of insider information at the socially 
optimal time.  
No race to disclose will occur unless the expected award for insiders increase 
beyond the critical threshold. As the equation below illustrates, a private 
individual in possession of information regarding fraud will come forward as soon 
as 1-P(x*) (t) B(t) > Z.96 
There are several instances where a prospective whistle blower maximizes his 
reward by delaying a qui tam filing. The relator will need to overcome the 
evidence threshold. In order to obtain a stake in the recovery, the whistle blower 
will need to secure sufficient information that will provide him with a strong 
claim as to be able to maintain having “direct and independent knowledge” in 
order to secure the status of original source of the information, once disclosed.97 
Also, the information will have to meet the requirement of “particularity”.98 In 
accordance with Rule 9(b) the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the time frame of the 
                                                                                                                                
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); X Corp. v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993). Christopher C. Frieden, 
Comment, Protecting the Government: Interests: Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act 
and the Government Right to Veto Settlements of those Actions, 47 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1056 
(1998), at note 73. 
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their families too, says C. Fred Alford, author of Whistleblowers:  Broken Lives and 
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fraud; (2) the place of occurrence; (3) the content of the false misrepresentations; 
and (4) what has been obtained or lost as a consequence of the fraud. This 
provides potential whistle blowers with an incentive to wait for the fraudulent 
practice to develop further in order to ameliorate these evidence problems. 
Secondly, the relator’s share of the recovery, as determined by the judge, will 
be based on the strength of the information provided by the relator.99 Where the 
government proceeds with the action, and where the court does not find the action 
to be based primarily based on the disclosure of the specific information provided 
by the relator the court will determine the share “depending upon the extent to 
which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action”.100 
Again, the timing of blowing the whistle might be prolonged if waiting increases 
the expected payoffs by allowing the insider to collect further evidence. 
These factors indicate that the private timing for whistle blowing might be 
socially sub-optimal: it might be in the interest of the whistle blower to stall in 
order to reduce uncertainty (gathering additional evidence) and increase the 
expected payoff (bigger fraud provides larger remuneration), while the 
government incurs further losses as the fraudulent activities develop with time. 
This perverse effect can be reversed by expanding recovery whenever the whistle 
blower demonstrates that he or she attempted to stop the fraud or reported it to a 
supervisor.101 Also, the percentage could be inversely correlated with the delay in 
filing the claim. This could be viewed as an expansion of the court’s approach in 
General Electric102 where a delay on coming forward reduced the percentage by 
two percent although the DOJ recommendation for more severe reduction.103 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Whistle blowing, remuneration and immunity are effective tools whenever law 
enforcement is impeded by information asymmetries. The U.S. False Claims Act 
(FCA), which allows private individuals to litigate fraudulent claims on behalf of 
the government, has been instrumental in combating government fraud. This 
paper provides an economic analysis of rewards as an alternative to punishment-
based deterrence and the FCA. The main findings can be summarized as follows. 
Our model points to a number of limits to the efficiency of using rewards as an 
alternative to punishment based deterrence. The gap between social and private 
incentives affects the decision to file a qui tam case and the timing of whistle 
blowing.  
First, the nature of their incentives and objectives of enforcement are different 
for the DOJ and potential whistle blowers. While an insider will blow the whistle 
whenever his expected recovery exceeds the expected costs of litigation, the DOJ 
pursues optimizes enforcement in the long run. The autonomy of whistle blowers 
to pursue claims without government involvement, weakens the government’s 
bargaining position towards the fraudulent party and might hamper the 
government’s ability weigh in other factors within the wider spectrum of 
enforcement (the effect of an individual case on a multiple claim suit, etc.).  
Second, whenever, the reward is tied to recovery, bounty awards create a 
perverse incentive whereby fraudulent practices are not terminated at a socially 
optimal point in time. The potential race among whistle blowers cannot mitigate 
this effect fully because the stigma and loss of opportunities on the job market act 
as internal constraints on whistle blowing. These constraints on the preventive 
effect of qui tam litigation provide a cautionary note against exclusive reliance on 
reward-based approaches to law enforcement. 
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